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PREFACE 
The trade agreement reached in November 1992 between the EC and 
the US has raised debate about its compatibility with the reform of the 
CAP decided upon in May 1992 by the Council of Ministers of Agricul-
ture. This study addresses the question whether or not the bilateral agree-
ment is likely to have additional impacts on EC-agriculture. First, the 
future development is assessed of EC-agriculture under the reformed 
CAP and then the commitments of the trade agreement are analyzed for 
possible additional consequences. 
The assessment of the consequences of CAP-reform for EC-agriculture 
is based upon simulation outcomes of the European Community Agricul-
tural Model (ECAM), an applied general equilibrium model of the EC with 
the emphasis on agriculture. The ECAM-project is a cooperative venture 
of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO), the Central 
Planning Bureau (CPB) and the Centre for World Food Studies (SOW-
VU). 
Research underlying this paper was carried out by C. Folmer (CPB), 
M.A. Keyzer (SOW-VU), M.D. Merbis (SOW-VU), H.J.J. Stolwijk (CPB) 
and P.J.J. Veenendaal (LEI-DLO). The study is simultaneously published 
by the three cooperating institutes, which are jointly responsible for its 
findings. 
Director SOW-VU 
W. Tims 
Director LEI-DLO 
/ L.C. Zachariasse G. Zalm 
Amsterdam/The Hague, June 1993 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations which is cur-
rently conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), was scheduled for completion by the end of 1990. 
However, as of March 1993, there is still no GATT-agreement. This does 
not mean that no progress has been made. On the contrary, step by step, 
negotiating parties have come closer to each other, and, although many 
obstacles still remain, it can safely be said that an agreement is within 
reach by now. 
The ambitious aims must, by hindsight, probably be pointed to as the 
main reason for the delay. For instance, for the first time in history it was 
agreed to consider agriculture within the GATT, a decision which would 
appear as a source of many quarrels mainly between the United States 
and the EC. On 20 December 1991 the Director-General of GATT, Mr. 
Dunkel, presented a Draft Final Act covering all issues under discussion. 
With respect to agricultural trade matters this draft will be referred to in 
this paper as the 'Dunkel Proposal'. 
Although some parties had serious reservations with respect to some 
sections of the proposal, it has been accepted as a base for further discus-
sions. In the course of these discussions it became clear that the disagree-
ment between the EC and the US was a major obstacle for any overall 
agreement. In the course of 1992 the EC and the US decided to start bi-
lateral talks on the basis of the Dunkel proposal, and in November the 
two parties reached an agreement. 
However, this bilateral agreement is controversial within the EC, and it 
has triggered many, often negative, reactions within the agricultural or-
ganizations. According to farm organizations, some food industries and 
other critics the agreement between the EC and the US is not consistent 
with the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as decided in 
1992 (the Mac Sharry-reform). The commitments following from the bi-
lateral discussions will result in a loss of markets and, consequently, in 
lower farm-gate prices. The European Commission does not endorse this 
view. In its opinion the outcome of the bilateral discussions is consistent 
with the Mac Sharry-reform. Moreover, according to the Commission, if 
the bilateral agreement will result in a multilateral agreement, 'the CAP is 
'safe' under the legal rules of GATT because of the adoption of the 'peace 
clause" (see CEC, 1992, p.10). 
In this paper the consequences of the Mac Sharry-reforms and the bi-
lateral agreement will be investigated and compared in more detail. The 
question which the paper tries to address is to what extent the bilateral 
agreement is compatible with the Mac Sharry- reform. To answer this 
question, we first evaluate the Mac Sharry reform package. We assess the 
consequences of the CAP-reforms for the period until 2000 in the absence 
of a GATT-agreement, making use of EC AM 1), an applied general equi-
librium model designed to evaluate changes of the CAP. Thereafter it will 
be checked whether additional measures are needed in order to meet the 
commitments of the agreement with the US. A second question to be 
addressed is which incentive structure the GATT is likely to induce and 
how the EC and EC-farmers will react to it. Finally, we will discuss to 
what extent the present bilateral agreement can be seen as a step toward 
liberalisation. 
1) ECAM is an acronym for European Community Agricultural Model. A short de-
scription of ECAM can be found in the Annex. It must be noted that ECAM imple-
ments the Mac Sharry reform for 1993-1996 and makes various assumption on CAP 
policies after 1996. 
THE REFORM OF THE CAP: 
EC-AGRICULTURE IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
GATT-AGREEMENT 
2.1 Summary of the reform 
Over the last decades several proposals for reforming the CAP have 
been formulated. The debate culminated in 1992 with the acceptance of a 
plan for fundamental reform. This so-called Mac Sharry plan modifies ex-
isting market regulations and extends current measures in the field of so-
cial and structural policy. We only study modifications of rules for market 
intervention. Market regulations change for cereals, oilseeds, tobacco, 
milk, beef and sheepmeat. 
In a nutshell these changes amount to the following. For some impor-
tant commodities price guarantees are reduced considerably, for example 
nominal prices for cereals, bovine meat and butter are decreased by about 
35, 15 and 5 per cent respectively. Thereby protection against outside 
competition is diminished, although the system of variable levies and re-
funds at the Community's border remains in place. Measures aimed at di-
rectly constraining or reducing production, such as set-aside obligations 
and production quota accompany the price changes. Farmers are compen-
sated for the loss of income by product-specific subsidies. The total value 
of these subsidies is constrained by the amounts that would be payable in 
some historical reference year. 
2.2 Scenario assumptions 
The reform package has been simulated with ECAM. A scenario has 
been formulated for the period 1992-2000, thus including the term of the 
GATT-agreement. The Mac Sharry-reforms are introduced in 1993 and 
gradually implemented in 1994 and 1995 in accordance with the Commis-
sion's decisions. The scenario shows the future of EC-agriculture under 
the reform assumptions 1). 
It is conditioned by a set of assumptions on exogenous variables relat-
ing to world market prices and the handling of inflation. 
First, with respect to world market prices we take the view that the 
evolution during the eighties has been an atypical one. World market 
prices of agricultural products have fallen much faster than their long-
term trend of 1-1.5 per cent per year in real terms (Grilli and Yang, 1988), 
and internal prices have increased compared to the world market, in spite 
of the stabilizer for cereals. Hence, it seems plausible to restore this im-
balance. World market prices for products which are not much affected by 
the Mac Sharry-reforms are therefore assumed to fall only very modestly. 
Table 2.1 World market prices in real terms (ecu per ton and average annual 
change rates) 
Wheat 
Coarse grains 
Rice 
Sugar 
Fats and oils 
Protein feed 
Carbohydrates 
Butter 
Dairy 
Bovine meat 
Ovine meat 
Pork 
Poultry, eggs 
Non-agric. tradeable 
(1981=100) 
1992 
96 
87 
220 
283 
327 
375 
82 
2010 
432 
1635 
1582 
2928 
10425 
152.2 
2000 
101 
93 
211 
271 
314 
334 
73 
1990 
425 
1642 
1556 
2812 
10015 
152.2 
Average annual 
change 1992-2000 
+0.54 
+0.54 
0.50 
0.50 
-0.50 
-1.26 
1.26 
0.20 
0.26 
0.00 
0.26 
0.50 
0.50 
0.00 
1) A detailed analysis of the Mac Sharry reforms with EC AM can be found in Folmer 
et al. (1993). 
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World market prices for products for which, due to the reform, the EC-
position on the world market will change drastically have been treated in 
a different way. In order to determine the magnitude of this change, use 
has been made of outcomes from the MISS model which has endogenous 
world market prices (Guyomard and Mahé, 1992). The results are sum-
marized in table 2.1. 
Secondly, one needs assumptions on inflation. The reform regulations 
suggest that the subsidies are fixed in nominal terms, but that they may be 
adjusted when circumstances become pressing. Here we have assumed 
that the compensations will be fixed in nominal terms and that an annual 
inflation rate of 3 per cent will prevail. Hence, real compensations 
decrease by 3 per cent per year. Intervention prices are assumed to be 
partly compensated for inflation. Depending on the product, intervention 
prices in ECAM decrease by 1 (quota products) to 3.0 per cent per year. 
2.3 EC-agriculture under Mac Sharry: production, demand and external 
trade 
Production 
Under the Mac Sharry-reform three instruments are deployed to con-
strain (the growth of) production: the set-aside obligation for basic arable 
crops, production quota and quota on the amounts of subsidies payable to 
the crop and beef producing sectors. The development of supply is also 
influenced by the reduced intervention prices and the accompanying com-
pensations. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the production figures for a selected number of 
commodities. To place the figures in some historical perspective, growth-
rates for the same commodities are also given for the period 1982-1992. 
According to ECAM the rate of growth in cereals production will be less 
than 1 per cent. Oilseeds production will also be heavily affected by the 
reform measures. One part of the decrease in cereals and oilseeds produc-
tion is caused by the set-aside obligation and the constraint on arable 
land. An (assumed) reduction of physical yields due to lower prices is re-
sponsible for the other part. Altogether it appears from simulations with 
the ECAM model that 2.9 million hectares of land will be set aside in the 
EC-9 under the Mac Sharry-reform. 
The Mac Sharry-reform reduces milk quota and introduces a quota for 
sheep. However, it is found that in the longer term some room for expan-
sion of milk quota is created through an increase of EC-demand. There-
fore, in ECAM it is assumed that in the long run quota can be relaxed 
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Table 2.2 Average yearly production growth-rates (per cent) for selected com-
modities 
Product 
Wheat 
Coarse grains 
Sugarbeet 
Oilseeds 
Consumable potatoes 
Dairy 
Eggs 
Bovine meat 
Sheep- and goat meat 
Pig meat 
Poultry meat 
1982-1992 
2.9 
0.2 
1.2 
11.4 
0.6 
0.4 
1.1 
0.4 
3.7 
2.0 
3.3 
1992-2000 
0.7 
0.4 
0.1 
0.6 
1.8 
0.3 
1.2 
2.2 
0.2 
1.8 
2.3 
somewhat. In spite of the imposition of quota, sheep meat production 
shows a modest increase because of the assumed improvement of yields 
with almost one per cent per year. Beef production increases also. This 
happens in almost all member states (except Belgium and Denmark), and 
becomes especially manifest after 1996. Cattle production is the only out-
let for livestock capacity, because milk production is under tight quotas 
and pork/poultry production are constrained by internal EC-demand. 
Consumption and intermediate demand 
The demand for agricultural products is characterized by low price and 
income elasticities. Combined with a barely growing population, this re-
sults, at most, in a marginal increase of overall consumer demand, even 
under falling (real) prices and moderate economic growth. Although 
model outcomes are in line with this general picture, growth differences 
among products are still remarkable. Consumption of wine and butter 
decreases somewhat, while consumer demand for vegetable oil and non-
bovine meat increases at more than the average rate. 
Because intermediate demand is much more price elastic than con-
sumer demand, shifts in the sector's own demand are more pronounced. 
Especially the usage of cereals increases. This can partly be explained by 
the small increase of intensive livestock production, but the replacement 
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of grains substitutes for feed grains appears to be the most important 
cause. Intermediate usage of grains increases until the year 2000 by about 
28 million metric tons. Over the period 1992-2000 the share of feed grains 
in total compound feeds increases by 12 per cent to 67 per cent. The reduc-
tion of cereals protection therefore clearly rehabilitates the position of 
grains in the compound feed package. 
External trade 
The Mac Sharry-reform contributes to an alleviation of trade disputes 
with third countries about the EC's exports of cereals. Already in 1996 net 
exports of cereals are about 25 million tons less than in 1992 (table 2.3). A 
combination of various effects explains the vanishing of the cereals ex-
ports: the set-aside obligation, the strong increase of intermediate 
demand, and an extensification effect in 1993. 
Compared with 1992, imports of grains substitutes are almost 25 per 
cent lower in 2000. For other commodities, the differences in net trade 
flows are, except for bovine meat, relatively minor. Sheep meat imports 
from third countries increase. This is caused by the quota on sheep. 
Table 2.3 External trade: net imports (+) and net exports (-) in million tons 
(EC-9) 
Product 1992 2000 
Wheat 
Coarse grains 
Sugar 
Fats and oils 
Protein feed 
Carbohydrates 
Butter 
Other dairy 
Bovine meat 
Ovine meat 
16.6 
9.2 
3.7 
+3.5 
-11.8 
•23.1 
0.1 
3.1 
0.1 
+0.1 
0.2 
+2.4 
2.4 
+5.3 
+8.0 
+18.5 
-0.0 
1.1 
0.6 
+0.4 
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2.33 
1.88 
1.87 
1.83 
1.33 
1.35 
1.40 
1.01 
1.80 
1.55 
1.30 
1.00 
2.4 EC-agriculture under Mac Sharry: prices, budget and value added 
Prices 
The Mac Sharry simulations reveal that protection at the EC's border, 
measured as the ratio of internal border prices and world market prices, 
will decrease significantly through time (see table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 Ratio of internal border prices and world market prices 
Product 1992 2000 
Wheat 
Coarse grains 
Sugar 
Butter 
Other dairy 
Bovine meat 
Under the Mac Sharry-reform, wheat protection decreases from about 
133 per cent in 1992 to 40 per cent in 2000. For coarse grains these percent-
ages are 88 and 1 respectively. The outcome for bovine meat is also re-
markable: at the end of the simulation period border prices for bovine 
meat will equal world market price levels. The decrease in protection rates 
is, apart from slight changes in trade and transport margins, the result of 
the Mac Sharry measures and of the drop in real prices due to inflation on 
the one hand and hardly falling or even rising (cereals) world market 
prices on the other. 
EAGGF-outlays 
Guarantee outlays of the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) for the Mac Sharry-reform are assessed in table 
2.5. Outlays for refunds on exports will decrease significantly while, on 
the other hand, producer subsidies due to the compensations per hectare 
and per animal show a drastic increase. The significant increase of outlays 
on Other EAGGF guarantee is especially due to the increase of producer 
subsidies in the member states not covered by ECAM (Spain, Greece and 
Portugal). 
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Table 2.5 EAGGF-guarantee outlays EC-12 (billion ecu and average yearly 
growth rates) 
Exports refunds 
Producer subsidies 
Consumer subsidies 
Input subsidies 
Storage costs 
Other guarantee 
Total 
1992 
6.4 
7.5 
1.6 
2.9 
3.5 
9.7 
32.2 
2000 
3.1 
14.7 
1.6 
2.8 
3.2 
12.6 
38.0 
Average yearly growth rates 
1982-1992 a) 
3.2 
14.0 
3.7 
3.2 
10.3 
23.6 
10.3 
1992-2000 b) 
8.7 
8.8 
0.0 
0.4 
1.1 
3.3 
2.1 
a) In nominal ecu; b) In real ecu. 
Total EAGGF-guarantee-outlays for the EC-12 are nearly 6 billion ecu 
higher in 2000 than in 1992. The growth of these outlays, 2.1 per cent per 
year, is of about the same order of magnitude as the spending guideline. 
Therefore, ECAM's simulation results suggest that it may be possible 
under the Mac Sharry-reform to satisfy the spending guideline of 1988. 
This result is sensitive to the assumption that intervention prices and com-
pensations are nominally fixed and that three per cent inflation has been 
assumed. Of course, the budgetary outlays will be higher if farmers re-
ceive fully indexed compensation. In previous runs, where the full indexa-
tion assumption was implemened (and higher cereal yields were 
assumed), the additional budget costs under the Mac Sharry-reform rose 
to 10 billion ecu. 
This increase is not really surprising. If income support is decoupled 
from price support, the amount of support becomes visible on the EC-
budget; consumers no longer pay the support indirectly through high 
food prices but directly through higher taxes which finance the EC-
budget. 
Value added 
According to ECAM real value added per person in agriculture in the 
period 1992-2000 is expected to decrease by about 0.5 per cent per year 
which is less than the yearly average of the preceding 10 years. The reduc-
tion in real value added should not be interpreted as a corresponding re-
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auction in income. Value added is only a very rough indicator for farm in-
come as depreciation, rent, interest, wages paid to employees are, among 
others, part of it. Moreover, because agriculture is characterized by a 
steady outflow of labour, the available income has to be shared among an 
ever smaller number of people. ECAM projects an average labour outflow 
of 2.6 per cent per year. 
2.5 EC-agriculture and the Mac Sharry-reform 
ECAM's simulation results show that under the Mac Sharry regime the 
development of agricultural incomes is rather stable with a slight shift 
from value added generated in the crop sector to that in the livestock sec-
tor. Under the Mac Sharry-reform real budgetary outlays will develop at 
the pace of 2.0 per cent per year and exports to the world market vanish 
for cereals but rise for beef. 
While price distortions are reduced, the regulations introduce quotas 
and rents on sheep and cereals, oilseeds, protein crops, fodder maize and 
cattle. These rents favour existing farmers, but create an additional finan-
cial burden for young farmers. On the other hand the restriction of agri-
cultural supply may have environmental benefits. 
Finally it must be emphasized that the nature of protection of the EC 
market does not change under the reform: the system of variable levies 
and export refunds remains in place. Criticism on the CAP by third coun-
tries, referring to lack of access to the EC market and unfair competition 
on the world market, will probably not come to an end under Mac Sharry, 
albeit that there is a clear tendency to withdraw from the world market. It 
will be investigated in the next section whether this is sufficient to meet 
the requirements following from the bilateral agreement with the US. 
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THE BILATERAL EC-US AGREEMENT AND 
THE CAP-REFORM 
3.1 Main elements of the agreement 
The bilateral agreement between the EC and the US relates mainly to 
market access, internal support and commitments on exports (CEC, 1992). 
Market access 
With respect to market access for third countries, two elements are of 
major importance. 
First, it has been agreed to change all non tariff border protection meas-
ures into customs tariffs (tariffication) and to reduce these tariffs by 36 per 
cent over a period of 6 years. The 36 per cent must be calculated as a 
simple mathematical average. Each individual tariff must be reduced by 
at least 15 per cent. The base period for calculating the tariffs is 1986-1988. 
Of relevance is that in case of excessive downward fluctuations on world 
markets, a variable element called 'special safeguard clause' is added 
automatically to the tariff. 
Secondly, it has been agreed that import opportunities will be opened 
in 1994 equalling 3 per cent of internal consumption of the reference pe-
riod and rising to 5 per cent in 2000. 
Internal support 
Internal support has to be reduced by 20 per cent in comparison with 
the base period 1986-1988. Internal support is expressed by an Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS). Roughly speaking the AMS is calculated 
as: 
AMS = l i Qi*(PmU-Pwm,i) 
where: 
Qi = Volume of production, product i 
Pint,i = Internal EC-price, product i 
Pwm,i = World market price, product i 
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For those products where market price support exists but for which cal-
culation of the AMS is, according to the original Dunkel text, unpractical, 
equivalent commitments will be undertaken. These equivalent commit-
ments are defined in Annex 6 of the Dunkel Proposal. 
Commitments on exports 
With respect to export two commitments have been foreseen. First, it 
has been agreed that direct export subsidies will be reduced by 36 per 
cent. Secondly, both the US and the EC have committed themselves to re-
duce the volume of subsidized exports by 21 per cent. The agreement re-
fers to a six year period and applies to individual products. The base 
period used for the calculations is 1986-1990. 
3.2 Preliminary assessment of the agreement 
Before we discuss the compatibility between the agreement and the 
evolution of EC-agriculture under the Mac Sharry-reform, some general 
remarks are in order. 
i) The AMS reduction is a central element in the agreement. By defini-
tion it is a sum total. Hence, an increase in protection for one com-
modity could be compensated by a reduction for an other. 
ii) Reduction of the AMS can also be obtained by reducing supply. 
Therefore, reduction of milk or sugar quotas is looked at as a reduc-
tion in support. 
iii) The tariffication contains a variable element to protect the EC-market 
from excessive fluctuations on world markets. This so-called 'special 
safeguard clause' may automatically be added to the tariff when the 
import price for the EC falls by more than 10 per cent below the average 
of 1986-1988. Actual world market prices are much lower than the im-
port prices for the EC in the base period, as calculated by the Com-
mission. This means that, in practice, the clause will become effective 
very soon (see CEC, 1992, table 2). 
iv) The average tariff reduction of 36 per cent is an unweighed average. 
Thus, a large reduction for an economically minor product can com-
pensate for a small reduction of an economically important product. 
v) As it appears, the agreement is in nominal terms. It is completely 
silent about inflation compensation, albeit that the original Dunkel Pro-
posal does contain a suggestion for adjustment in case of excessive in-
flation rates. The effect of inflation can easily surpass the effect of the 
reduction rates of the agreement. 
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vi) Direct producer subsidies are not subject to any reduction commit-
ment. They fall within the so-called 'green box'. The implication is 
that a fall in farmers' income due to a decrease in border protection 
can be compensated by 'decoupled' subsidies. 
vii) It must be stressed also that the GATT should in principle cover 
processed agricultural products as well and not just raw commodi-
ties. However, the tariffication of processed commodities, e.g. alcohol 
beverages, processed meat products, is extremely cumbersome. The 
constituents of the processed products must be known for each pro-
duct traded, the corresponding tariffs must be attached and aggre-
gated to obtain the tariff of the final product. If world market prices of 
the constituents change, tariffs change. This would become a great ad-
ministrative burden, as it is now for the EC refunds, unless a flat tariff 
is agreed upon. The apparent solution is to let tariffication apply to 
food products which consist of one dominant constituent (cereals, 
beef, cheese etc.) only. 
viii)Within the EC green rates apply which are member-state specific. 
Since the border price is based upon the (green) intervention price for 
a number of products, it is impossible to define one central border 
price for the EC unless green rates are fully harmonized over member 
states. The present volatility of the exchange-rate mechanism makes 
full harmonization in the near future unlikely. If the MCA's, which 
have been abolished in 1992, would return, border prices could even 
be country and product specific. The GATT rules are not completely 
clear how to deal with the green rates of the EC [or they are imprecise 
because they assume an approximate central green rate]. In our analy-
sis we proceed from one central border price. 
ix) Finally, we want to stress that if the bilateral agreement is accepted by 
other GATT-parties, the resulting multilateral agreement is only a 
small step towards free trade in agricultural products. The agreement 
is still far away from the initial proposal of the US to cut all farm sub-
sidies within ten years. 
In the remainder of this section we will investigate to what extent EC-
agriculture will be affected by the bilateral agreement. 
3.3 The effect of the AMS-commitment 
In section 2 it was explained why CAP-reform and developments on 
the world market will, for most products, result in a decrease in the ratio 
of internal border prices and world market prices in the coming years. It 
was also shown that production of most products will increase in the pe-
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riod 1993-2000. These two developments have opposite effects on the 
AMS. However, the figures of tables 2 and 4 suggest that, on balance, a 
net decrease of the aggregated measure of support is likely. A detailed cal-
culation confirms this. Compared with the base period, ECAM forecasts a 
fall in the AMS by 62 per cent in the period until 2000. To the extent that a 
multilateral GATT-agreement will result in higher world market prices 
than the ones quoted in table 2.1, this outcome would even be an under-
estimation of the foreseeable reduction. 
According to the bilateral agreement, the AMS should have fallen by 20 
per cent in the year 2000 relative to the base period. Because the 20 per 
cent refers to a nominal amount, a correction for inflation has to be made. 
At an average yearly inflation rate of 3 per cent, the AMS commitment 
amounts to about 37 per cent (l-((l-0.2)/1.038)) of the AMS in the base pe-
riod. This correction does not change the conclusion according to which 
realization of the AMS-part of the agreement will not be a problem for the 
EC. Others (e.g. Guyomard et al., 1992) arrive at the same conclusion. 
The ease with which the AMS commitment can be realised is above all 
caused by (i) the possibility of summation over products, (ii) the fact that 
all subsidies per hectare and per animal are in the green box and (iii) the 
very low world market prices in the base period. 
3.4 The effect of the import and export commitments 
The agreements with respect to minimum access opportunities and 
volumes of subsidized exports apply for individual products (or commod-
ity groups). Therefore, an assessment of the effects of the commitments 
has to be performed on a product by product base. The discussion will be 
limited to the main surplus products only. 
Cereals 
Relative to the reference period, the estimated net effect of the agree-
ment on the EC-cereal balance amounts to 13 million tons (Van Berkum, 
1993). At the end of the term of the GATT-agreement the EC is allowed to 
export 23.4 million tons of cereals (CEC, 1992). The ECAM-outcomes 
show that meeting this will not pose any problem. Lower internal prices 
combined with the set-aside regulations will result in a drastic reduction 
of the growth rates for cereals. Moreover, the Mac Sharry-reforms will 
lead to a sharp increase in the usage of cereals by the EC-feed sector. To-
gether these developments will by the year 2000 result in a vanishing of 
cereals exports (table 2.3). Although Blom (1992) and Roningen (1992) are 
less optimistic with respect to the Mac Sharry effect on the increase in in-
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ternal demand for feed grains, they also conclude that the effect will be 
large enough to meet the GATT-requirement. 
Sugar 
Table 2.3 shows that sugar exports are predicted to fall by about 1.5 
million tons or 40 per cent in the period 1992-2000. This gives a crude in-
dication that meeting the requirement of the bilateral agreement with re-
spect to market access and export reduction for sugar will cause no 
problems for the Community either. However, for a more precise conclu-
sion one has to take into account that part of the sugar exports of the EC 
consists of so-called C-sugar which is exported without subsidy and that 
the EC has committed itself to import 1.3 million tons of sugar from the 
ACP-countries every year. Part of the latter is re-exported. Exports of C-
sugar and re-exports of ACP-sugar are not subject to reduction. Therefore, 
the export reduction is less than the base period export statistics suggest. 
According to the Commission the export commitment implies a reduction 
in sugar exports of 153,000 tons in the six year period only (CEC, 1992). 
Because sugar consumption in the EC has increased by some 80,000 tons a 
year in recent years, the export requirement can be satisfied if this trend 
continues. This is even more so if one considers that, because of the im-
ports from ACP-countries, no additional imports are necessary. 
Dairy products 
ECAM distinguishes only two dairy products: butter and other dairy. 
GATT-commitments have been made for four dairy products, as sum-
marized in table 3.1. The import and export commitments amount to 
Table 3.1 Quantity commitments on imports and (subsidized) exports, 2000 
relative to 1991, in 1,000 ton milkequivalents 
Export Import Net export 
change change change 
Butter and butter oil 564 
Skimmed milk powder 291 
Cheese -1414 
Other -1460 
Total -2019 3263 -5282 
Source: Van Berkum (1993). 
11 
207 
376 
837 
1843 
357 
-85 
-2251 
-3303 
slightly more than 5 million metric tonnes of milkequivalents, or 4.8 per 
cent of total milk production in the EC. Under the Mac Sharry regime it is 
possible to reduce milkquota by two per cent. Moreover, due to growing 
consumer demand, the offtake of most dairy products within the EC in-
creases at a rate around of 0.75 per cent per year. On the basis of a 
straightforward calculation it can be concluded that meeting the commit-
ments will not pose a problem. 
This conclusion is corroborated by the ECAM-simulation. The ECAM-
outcomes even show that milk production can be expanded by the end of 
the nineties. There are three additional reasons why expansion is a serious 
possibility indeed. First, the GATT-commitments refer to the EC of 1992. 
The Canary Islands and the EFTA countries are considered as third coun-
tries. However, since January 1993 the Canary Islands are fully integrated 
in the Community. Consequently exports to these Islands are, by defini-
tion, not counted as exports to third countries anymore. A same kind of 
administrative reduction in exports to third countries will appear once 
EFTA countries become members of the EC. 
Secondly, the import commitment is not an obligation to buy but rather 
an obligation to offer third countries the opportunity to sell. As can be 
seen from table 3.1 the commitment has above all consequences for cheese 
and other dairy products (e.g. fresh milk products). It is not at all self-evi-
dent that third countries will want to use the additional export opportu-
nity. A significant part of the additional imports must come from 
countries where internal milk prices are even higher than in the EC. Ex-
ports at world market prices will not be attractive for these countries. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that due to the drastic decrease of 
subsidized exports, world market prices for dairy products will, in case of 
a multilateral agreement, definitely increase. Hence it will become more 
attractive for the EC-dairy sector to increase its unsubsidized exports, par-
ticularly because demand for unsubsidized product will certainly in-
crease. 
Although there are no problems to be expected for the total dairy sec-
tor, there might be some for cheese. The growth of EC cheese production 
in recent years may need temporary suspension in order to fulfil the ex-
port commitment (see Van Berkum, 1993). 
Bovine meat 
The EC is both a large exporter and a large importer of bovine meat. As 
long as imports do not fall below the level of the base period, the import 
commitment will be met. With respect to exports, matters seem more com-
plicated. The ECAM run foresees a rapid increase in bovine meat produc-
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tion and a relatively slow growth in consumption. In the year 2000 the 
gross surplus (net exports + imports) amounts to about 1.4 million tons. 
According to the commitment, the EC is allowed to export 0.8 million tons 
bovine meat with subsidy only. Still ECAM outcomes suggest that there is 
no problem. If we assume a rapid deterioration of intervention conditions, 
as done in ECAM, then at the end of the GATT-term the border prices will 
be more or less equal to world market prices. In that situation subsidiza-
tion of exports is not necessary anymore. 
3.5 The effect of reduced border protection 
Protection has been defined as the difference between the internal 
border price and the world market price. Therefore, prior to a discussion 
on the effect of the commitments directed at reducing existing border pro-
tection, the effects of a GATT-agreement on world market prices have to 
be assessed. 
World market prices 
A multilateral GATT-agreement will have a positive effect on world 
market prices which means that, ceteris paribus, a GATT-agreement will 
automatically result in a decrease of border protection. Although there is 
not much dispute on this, it is difficult to assess the precise effect on world 
market prices. 
To avoid the risk of being overly optimistic, in analyzing the con-
sequences of tariffication and the reduction of export subsidies for the EC, 
we proceed from the conservative position that world market prices for 
cereals and sugar will not be affected by a multilateral agreement. On the 
other hand we assume a real price rise of 0.5 per cent per year for beef. 
This increase is motivated by the fact that beef exports to Japan and the 
NIC's will probably be stimulated by an agreement. On the heavily pro-
tected dairy markets larger price increases can be expected. Following van 
Berkum (1993) we proceed for all dairy products (except butter) on the as-
sumption of a real price rise of 3 per cent per year. These rates are addi-
tional to the price developments quoted in table 2.1. 
Tariffication 
According to the bilateral agreement the EC farmer will in 2000 be pro-
tected against outside competition by (nominal) tariffs which are, on aver-
age, 36 per cent below the tariff in the base period. Table 3.2 summarizes 
the effect of this part of the commitment on the competitiveness of the EC 
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Table 3.2 Customs tariffs and border prices in 2000 for some important com-
modities (ecu per ton) 
Product 
Wheat 
Coarse grains 
Sugar 
Butter 
Dairy 
Bovine meat 
Tariff 
nominal a) 
(1) 
95 
94 
419 
1896 
187 d) 
1608 
real 
(2) 
77 
76 
339 
1531 
151 
1299 
Import 
price b) 
(3) 
178 
169 
610 
3521 
658 
2991 
Border 
price c) 
(4) 
154 
114 
547 
3387 
568 
1967 
a) Nominal tariffs taken from CEC (1992); b) World market price + real tariff; c) Border prices ac-
cording to ECAM; d) Tariff derived from tariff on skimmed milk powder (1 kg smp = 5.09 units of 
dairy). 
at the border. The first column of the table lists the (nominal) tariffs allo-
wed in 1999 according to the EC (CEC, 1992). In the second column these 
tariffs have been deflated by 3 per cent per year. The sum of these and the 
world market price (table 2.1, corrected for GATT-price effects of dairy 
and beef) equals the net import price at the EC-border. The last column 
shows the EC-border prices according to ECAM. The outcomes of the cal-
culation do not justify any fear for a pressure on internal prices due to ta-
riffication and a subsequent reduction of tariffs. This 'optimistic' 
conclusion rests mainly on the height of the tariffs in the base year. In the 
agreement these tariffs are determined as the differences between the EC 
intervention prices raised by ten per cent and the world market prices in 
the base period. EC-intervention prices were relatively high in the base 
period while world market prices for most products were low. 
Also of relevance is the fact that the agreement contains a special 
safeguard provision which becomes effective in case the EC import price 
falls below a pre specified price. It is not unimportant to note that these 
'pre specified prices', are much higher than the average world market 
prices in the base period (see CEC, 1992). 
Reduced export subsidies 
Although the Mac Sharry-reforms will, among other things, result in 
a tendency of EC-agriculture to withdraw from world markets, for some 
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Table 3.3 Maximum export subsidies and border prices in 2000 for some impor-
tant commodities (ecu per ton) 
Product 
Wheat 
Coarse grains 
Sugar 
Butter 
Dairy 
Bovine meat 
Maximum 
Nominal ; 
(1) 
85 
88 
389 
2317 
192 c) 
1542 
export subsidy 
a) Real 
(2) 
69 
71 
314 
1872 
155 
1245 
World market 
price 
(3) 
101 
93 
271 
1990 
507 
1692 
Border 
price b) 
(4) 
85 
43 
233 
1515 
413 
722 
a) Nominal export subsidies calculated from CEC (1992, GATT concession list, supporting table 
11); b) Border prices according to ECAM; c) Tariff derived from tariff on skimmed milk powder (1 
kg smp = 5.09 units of dairy). 
products the EC will remain a net exporter. Because internal EC-prices for 
most products are expected to stay above corresponding prices on the 
world market, export subsidies to bridge internal and external prices will 
still be necessary in the future. Table 3.3 summarizes the results of a calcu-
lation which seeks to determine whether the competitiveness of the EC on 
the world market is affected by the bilateral agreement. The maximum 
amount of subsidy per ton of product i in 2000 (column (1) is calculated 
as: 
SU = (l-a)Si /b/(l-ß)Qi,b 
where: 
Si,f = Maximum export-subsidy per ton in 2000, product i 
Si,b = Total export-subsidy in the base period, product i 
Qi,b = Volume of subsidized exports in the base period 
a = Reduction-factor of total export-subsidy ( a = 0.36) 
ß = Reduction-factor of volume of subsidized exports 
(ß = 0.21) 
In column (2) of table 3.3 the deflated subsidy amounts are shown. 
Column (3) lists the product prices on the world market. The minimum 
supply prices of the EC are shown in column (4). They have been calcu-
lated as the differences between EC border prices and the maximum ex-
port subsidies (column (2)). 
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A comparison between columns (3) and (4) reveals that the subsidies 
per ton that are still allowed under the GATT will be more than sufficient 
to bridge the gap between internal and external prices. It must be stressed 
that the assumptions underlying the calculations are very conservative. 
For example, it has been assumed that volumes of subsidized exports will 
decrease by 21 per cent only. As was discussed above, ECAM outcomes 
indicate much larger reductions (see table 2.3). Consequently maximum 
subsidies per ton can even be higher than the amounts quoted in table 3.3. 
3.6 Incentives to implement the commitments 
The commitments made during the negotiations are intentions only. It 
is not indicated how to implement them. In the discussion so far we have 
attempted to show that these commitments do not require much adjust-
ment in the present CAP after the Mac Sharry-reform. Nevertheless, sub-
stantial uncertainty remains as to how the farmers will react to the Mac 
Sharry-reform. The present discussion is only in terms of model forecasts. 
In practice there may be unexpected future developments. In that case the 
commitments on EC exports will be the first to be violated. A small differ-
ence in intra-EC supply or demand leads to a large variation in net ex-
ports and this creates a wide margin of uncertainty. 
When unanticipated developments occur and commitments become 
binding, the EC could in the short-term restrict exports through stock ad-
justments and then, in the medium term, raise set asides for crops and re-
duce production quota for livestock. For beef, where no quota exist 
another mechanism like quota on subsidized exports could be introduced. 
However, because of the 'volatility' of net exports, such adjustments 
could lead to problems in fine-tuning the policies and the resulting per-
manent interference with the farmer's decision process through new regu-
lations is bound to be distortionary. Moreover, farmers would suffer. 
We argue that a way out is to make use of the fact that unsubsidized 
exports fall outside the committed volumes. Any relabelling of previously 
subsidized exports as unsubsidized exports reduces subsidized exports. 
This suggests two ways to avoid the pressures from the export commit-
ments. 
First, the EC could increase acreage subsidies (which are not counted as 
protection) and simultaneously reduce the intervention price. This would 
however affect demand and, more importantly, increase the budgetary ex-
penditures of the Community. 
Second, producer's organizations could recur to practices of market 
segmentation, producing 'C-crops' and 'C-livestock' like C-sugar. When-
ever a significant part of the farmer's costs are of the nature of set-up 
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costs, an overall reduction in producer prices compensated by increased 
subsidies per unit within an A-quotum would hardly affect output levels. 
If this type of practices becomes pervasive (and the possibility of ex-
porting unsubsidized production is granted explicitly in the current 
agreement), the disciplining role of the GATT-agreement will be severely 
reduced, at least in the short-run, when the Community preference is 
maintained. One could put it like this. As long as imports are being pro-
tected a significant rent is created not just on import but on domestic 
demand as well, which can accrue to the farmers. The schemes with 'C-
crops' only give up a subsidy on exports which is relatively insignificant 
when compared to the total rent (as measured, say by the AMS). 
However, what remains is the long-run effect of tariffication. As soon 
as tariffication eliminates the prevailing Community preference, it will 
undermine the basic principles of the CAP. Consumers and the feed in-
dustry will become linked to world prices. In that case the second option 
of market segmentation is ruled out. Because the option of direct support 
is costly for the tax payer, this option will be hard to maintain either. 
Hence it seems that the upcoming GATT-agreement, if at all reached, 
will for agriculture serve to put the (tariffication) machinery into place for 
rounds of negotiation in the future when Community preference will have 
been eroded by inflation. Then negotiations can start on the basis of tariffs 
which are effective, so that tariff reductions will (finally) have visible im-
pact on the EC markets. 
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4. SUMMARY AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
For the first time in history it is tried to integrate agriculture into the 
rules of the GATT, the periodic multilateral negotiations aiming at more 
liberalised international trade. Reasons of food security combined with 
vested interests in the agricultural sector of many industrial countries 
successfully resisted earlier initiatives to decrease existing high levels of 
domestic support for agricultural products. Although these vested inter-
ests have again shown their strength during the Uruguay round, it is un-
likely that a multilateral agreement will be blocked by agricultural 
policies. The recent bilateral agreement between the EC and the US is a 
clear indication that countervailing forces have gained significant 
strength. The EC-US agreement, which is a modified version of the 
Dunkel Proposal, has a good chance to be accepted by the other negotiat-
ing parties as well. 
In this paper we have analyzed the consequences of the agreement for 
the agricultural sector of the EC. Such an analysis is hampered by the fact 
that the CAP is on the eve of the most drastic reform since its existence. 
An analysis of the bilateral agreement has to be preceded by an analysis of 
the CAP-reform. 
The consequences of the CAP-reform have been traced with ECAM, a 
general equilibrium model of EC-agriculture. The model outcomes sug-
gest that the reform will, among others, result in (i) a withdrawal of the 
EC from the international grain market; (ii) much lower (real) internal 
prices; (iii) a sharp increase in the amount of producer subsidies; and (iv) 
in lower outlays on export refunds. 
In the second part of the paper, the results of the simulations have been 
compared with the commitments of the bilateral trade-agreement. It ap-
pears that the agreement is, in broad terms, compatible with the CAP-re-
form; thus incomes of EC farmers will be hardly affected by it. Because of 
the CAP-reform the AMS-commitment as defined in the bilateral agree-
ment, i.e. excluding producer subsidies, will be easily met. Moreover, be-
cause of the choice for the base period, the height of the initial tariffs and 
the 'special safeguard clause', the effect of tariffication will probably be 
negligible as well. Because of developments in internal demand and 
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supply net surplus of many products will decrease significantly anyhow. 
Hence commitments on minimum access and subsidized exports will not 
be very demanding either. It must be stressed also that by the full integra-
tion of the Canary Islands and an eventual EC-membership of the EFTA 
countries, the definition of 'third countries' changes. Commitments on im-
port access and export reduction are favourably affected by this. 
These conclusions refer to the term of the agreement. In the longer run 
the consequences of the agreement will probably become more visible. 
Community preference will, step by step, erode by inflation. And ne-
gotiated tariff reductions, in a second round, will (finally) become effec-
tive. 
The main point on which the results of our analysis have to be qualified 
relates to the fact that the commitments of the agreement are (partly) ex-
pressed in nominal amounts. In the analysis we have proceeded from an 
average inflation rate of 3 per cent per year and no indexation. If inflation 
rates are significantly higher, the absence of indexation will cause a rapid 
decrease in border protection. Because the original Dunkel Proposal con-
tains a (rather vague) safety clause in case border protection is eroded by 
excessive inflation rates, it is not very likely that such a situation will 
occur. 
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ANNEX 1. AN OUTLINE OF EC AM 
ECAM is a recursively dynamic, applied general equilibrium (AGE-) model. It follows 
the approach to AGE-modelling with inequality constraints and price rigidities described 
in Fischer et al. (op.cit, ch. 2). Further details on ECAM are given in Folmer et al. (1989). 
Here we only list characteristic features of this model. 
ECAM describes the intra-EC market clearing at given international prices and policy 
interventions. It covers the EC excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain and distinguishes 19 
agricultural commodities, one nontradeable, national non-agricultural and one tradeable 
non-agricultural commodity. It operates at national level with a consumer demand and 
an agricultural supply module as basic elements, the parameters of which have been ob-
tained via time series estimation. 
(a) Consumer demand follows expenditure minimization according to a two-level demand 
system: at the lower level a linear expenditure system (LES) with trends on commit-
ments for food demand; at upper level an AIDS-system for food, beverages and 
tobacco and non-food. 
(b) Agricultural supply is modeled via a one-period, revenue maximizing nonlinear pro-
gram with a land constraint, a livestock-feed energy constraint and a livestock operat-
ing-capacity constraint. Milk quota are imposed as upper bound on milk supplies. 
The constraint set is completed with commodity balances including a greenfodder 
balance. Yields of crops and animals follow exogenously specified trends which re-
flect technical progress. Nonlinearity enters via production and transformation func-
tions, which because of the decomposable structure of the program, can be dealt with 
via separate cost and revenue functions. Details can be found in Keyzer (1989 a, b). 
(c) Resources. The resource availabilities of labour, land and operating capacity are ad-
justed prior to (i.e. recursively on) the nonlinear program. 
(d) Non-agricultural supply. Tradeable non-agricultural production is treated as an exo-
genous variable. Nontradeable non-agricultural production (mainly construction and 
services) is endogenously produced under constant returns to scale with fixed mark-
up rate over variable costs. 
(e) Exchange component. The problem of obtaining an equilibrium solution for the EC-
economy in a given year is solved in the model's exchange component. Equilibrium is 
established through an iterative process at EC-market level. On the EC-market the 
sellers of production compete with traders with the outside world and possibly the 
public stock authorities to satisfy total EC-demand. EC-clearing prices adjust until EC-
commodity balances are cleared and national consumers are at maximum utility. 
During the adjustment process the feed demand structure adjusts to achieve cost min-
imization but the livestock numbers are kept fixed. 
When an equilibrium solution for the model is obtained, all information is available to 
print detailed and integrated accounts, both in value and in volume terms, which to-
gether depict the complete economy, at national level as well as at EC-level. 
(f) The community budget. The budgetary rules in ECAM, which reflect actual CAP reg-
ulations as closely as possible, are the following: 
34 
(i) The Community-budget balances through adjustment of contributions by mem-
ber states, called VAT-transfers. 
(ii) These transfers are distributed over member states in proportion to their respec-
tive value-added at factor cost. 
(iii) The national governments may incur a budget-deficit which is financed through 
private and/or foreign savings. 
(iv) Levies, tariffs and refunds on trade with non-members accrue directly to the 
Community. 
(v) National governments are compensated by the Community for payment of EC-
subsidies on supply and demand and of Monetary Compensatory Amounts. 
(vi) Buffer stocks are held by member states in exogenously set, commodity-specific 
proportions. National governments finance these stocks through government 
bonds. The Community repays interest and storage costs as well as losses on 
stock. 
(g) Recursively dynamic simulation. ECAM is solved under a recursively dynamic mode. 
For given levels of supply by agriculture and tradeable non-agriculture, given inter-
national prices and CAP-policies, the exchange component is solved, starting in the 
base-year 1982. Then, using the various equilibrium prices, resource adjustments take 
place, the agricultural supply decision is solved and non-agricultural supply adjusts. 
Finally, policy updates are introduced setting the stage for a next year of simulation 
and so on until the end of the simulation period. This is more or less a descriptive 
mode of simulation as opposed to a normative one where one would expect agents 
behaviour to be time consistent and intertemporally efficient, at least over the horizon 
of simulation. 
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